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Arguably, the introduction of controls is a key methodological tool in scientific experimentation. 
Yet there are surprisingly few historical and philosophical studies of the concept of 
experimental control, and what little there is does not form a coherent picture. There is some 
work specifically on the emergence and career of randomized controlled trials, focusing on 20th 
century psychological and medical research (Hacking 1988, Keating and Cambrosio 2012). Often 
R. A. Fisher’s agricultural experiments from the early 20th century are presented as a milestone 
in the discussion (e.g. Hall 2007) Some historians have hinted at a connection between 
controlled experiments and the process of industrialization and have argued that the concept 
of experimental control emerged in the mid- or late 19th century (Figlio 1977, Pauly 1987). 
Other scholars have suggested that controlled experiments were already performed in the late 
18th century (Dunn 1997); yet others date their origin back to the Middle Ages (Crombie 1952) 
and even to Antiquity (Knoefel 1988, Stigler 1974). 
 
 The historiographical conundrum has not been tackled; and broader systematic analyses of the 
concept, the epistemological significance of the practice of controlling, or the conditions of the 
emergence of the methodological idea behind experimental controls do not exist. In this paper, 
I seek to prepare the ground for such a broader analysis. I offer a historical and philosophical 
interpretation of control(led) experiments in the biomedical sciences, focusing on the second 
half of the 19th century. I disentangle different strands of the history of control(led) 
experiments, draw some crucial conceptual distinctions among different meanings of the 
concept of control, and identify a number of questions that a historical and philosophical 
analysis of control experiments need to answer. 
 
 First of all, it is obviously important to distinguish between the emergence of the terms 
“control experiment,” “experimental control”, etc. and the history of the methods or strategies 
of experimentation that these terms refer to. Based on this distinction, a simple solution to the 
historiographical conundrum suggests itself: Perhaps the experimental strategies that came to 
be called “controls” had been applied long before the introduction of the term – maybe already 
in Antiquity – even though the methodological terms “controlling”, “control experiment,” 
“(experimental) control”, etc. emerged in the second half of the 19th century? However, it 
seems to me that if we adopt this solution, we overstate the similarities between experimental 
strategies, and we downplay differences in the different contexts and historical settings in 
which these strategies were applied and in the significance that past experimenters attached to 
them. 
 
 I begin my presentation with a survey of concepts of control in late 19th-century bacteriology, 
immunology, and experimental embryology. I pay particular attention to the works of 
influential and methodologically reflective investigators, especially William Henry Welch, Paul 
Ehrlich and his co-workers, and Jacques Loeb. The concept of control plays an important role in 
all of these works. But it is used in at least three ways: to refer to a strategy that “controls for” 
the impact of specific factors on the outcome of experiments, to refer to a practice that 
corrects for unknown variables in the experiment, and to refer to the calculated design of new 
forms of organic life. 
 
 In the second part of my paper, I consider several 19th-century methodologies of 
experimentation that had an impact on methodological thought in late 19th-century 
biomedicine, namely the methodologies advocated by the French clinician Pierre Louis, John 
Stuart Mill, Claude Bernard, and the German embryologist Wilhelm Roux. While none of these 
methodologies mentioned the concept of control, each of them introduced strategies of 
securing experimental results that involved elements of comparison. But there are significant 
differences with regard to what was compared and for what purposes. According to Louis, 
experiments could be made more secure by comparing two populations, one of which receives 
treatment. According to Mill and Roux, causal factors can best be identified if two experimental 
situations are compared in which all conditions are held constant except the one under study. 
According to Bernard, experiments could be made more secure if a specimen is compared to a 
second, which is subjected to the same treatment except for a change in the variable under 
study. 
 
 In the third part of my paper, I bring the first two parts together and draw out a number of 
implications for a historically and philosophically informed account of control(led) experiments. 
Obviously, “the” history of experimental controls does not exist. Rather, we need to distinguish 
at least two traditions in the discussion about controls, the comparison of populations and the 
comparison of individual experiments. The works of Louis and Fisher are part of the first 
tradition, but during the 19th century there was little discussion about the problem of 
comparing populations (Coleman 1987). The second tradition – the most relevant for 
methodological thought in late 19th-century biomedicine – includes works by Mill, Bernard, 
Roux, Welch, Ehrlich, and others. In this tradition, the introduction of the term “control” came 
together with a loss of trust in the practical applicability of Mill’s method of difference. We find 
criticisms of Mill’s method in the writings of both Bernard and Roux. The concept of control 
came to be used after these experimenters had advanced the view that Mill’s methodology of 
experimentation expressed an unattainable ideal, and that Mill’s method could not address the 
most pressing problems of scientific experimentation in the life sciences – the complexity of 
living things. Finally, Jacques Loeb’s notion of “control” is the only concept that can be traced to 
an engineering context (Pauly 1987). But if we read Loeb’s work against the background of 
contemporaneous methodologies, it becomes immediately clear that he did not use the term 
“control” in a methodological sense. 
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